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Under what conditions does an agent stand to a harmful outcome in such a way that it is fitting 
for others to be morally indignant with her over the outcome, or for her to feel guilt over it? A 
popular answer requires that the outcome happened because of the agent, or that the agent was 
a cause of the outcome. In this paper, I motivate a related but importantly different answer: An 
agent stands in the right way to the outcome—is implicated in that outcome—only when the 
agent’s morally substandard responsiveness to reasons, or substandard caring, is relevantly 
involved in a normal explanation of it. This answer, I further argue, makes sense because when 
an agent’s substandard caring is so involved, the outcome provides a lesson against such caring, 
a lesson central to the function of guilt and indignation. 
 Throughout the paper, I’ll say that an agent who stands in the relevant relation to an 
outcome is responsible for it. But “responsibility” is multiply ambiguous, and my use is partly 
technical.1 The term could also be used to signify the relation required for an agent to deserve 
punishment for their role in an outcome, be liable to compensate for a harm resulting from it, 
or be liable to be harmed in defense of a threat posed by the outcome. I set these latter forms of 
responsibility aside. It is at least conceptually possible that one can be subject to fair punishment 
or liable to defensive harm or compensatory demands even if all one’s actions have been justified 
and indignation would be misplaced.2 
 As stated, my concern is specifically with responsibility for outcomes, or states and events that 
are not constituted by the agent’s actions or responses or lack thereof to a situation: examples 
include an eroded friendship, a destroyed place of worship, or the deaths of hundreds of 
thousands of children from economic sanctions. In line with ordinary moral thinking, but 
contrary to some luck-based skepticism, I will assume that we can be responsible for such 
outcomes in ways that make indignation and guilt over those outcomes fitting.3  
 Indignation over the injustice of some outcome need not target an agent. But when it does, 
it presupposes that the agent had (i) some capacity for understanding the values at stake, 
(ii) some sort of self-control, (iii) some relevant relation to the outcome, typically understood as 
a relation of control, and (iv) knowledge or access to evidence of that relation. Since my focus 
                                               
1 Though technical, the use follows a tradition from Peter Strawson (1962) of understanding responsibility as 
a precondition for reactive attitudes. 
2 Cf. Jeff McMahan’s (2005) suggestion that liability to defensive harm requires a form of responsibility for 
the threat, but not the sort of involvement that makes guilt and indignation fitting. One might disagree with 
McMahan’s suggestion, but it is not conceptually incoherent. For some recent discussions of what sort of 
involvement is required for liability to defensive harm, see e.g. Kutz 2007; Frowe 2014; Haque 2017. 
3 For luck-based skepticism, see e.g. Enoch and Marmor 2007. For my account of why intuitions driving such 
skepticism shouldn’t be trusted, see Björnsson and Persson 2012. 
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here will be entirely on the third condition—the outcome relation—I will take for granted that other 
conditions are satisfied in the cases discussed unless otherwise stated. When I say that someone 
is the fitting target of indignation over something, I am saying that they satisfy the internal 
correctness conditions of such indignation, or the conditions that the systems responsible for 
producing indignation are supposed to track. I am not saying that that everyone or even anyone 
would be overall justified in nurturing or expressing such indignation.4 
 I begin in section 1 by looking at problems for some natural accounts of the outcome 
relation. Section 2 suggests that these problems are avoided if we take the fittingness of guilt and 
indignation to be premised on a causal-explanatory requirement. Sections 3 and 4 introduce 
familiar counterexamples to the explanatory requirement: cases involving collective harms and 
“fungible switches”. Both kinds of cases suggest that the causal-explanatory requirement must 
be weakened. Section 5, finally, proposes such a weakening—it is enough that the agent’s 
substandard will is involved in a normal explanation of the outcome—and motivates it with 
reference to the nature of guilt and indignation.  
 
1. Closing in on the requirement of explanatory control 
The idea that responsibility for outcomes involves a causal or explanatory component of some 
sort is widely accepted, though not universally so.5 One reason is that it faces the sort of 
counterexamples that will be discussed in Sections 3 and 4. But another reason is that the causal-
explanatory relation itself has been notoriously hard to pin down.6 Since some constraints on 
that relation will be of relevance when considering counterexamples, this section begins to 
motivate a requirement of explanatory control by noting how some related suggestions get cases 
wrong. We start with the tempting suggestion that outcome responsibility requires: 
 
CONTROL WHETHER: The agent had control over whether the outcome would materialize 
or not.7 
 
For many cases, this seems to be exactly what makes the agent responsible for something. 
Consider: 
 
Wiley’s Window: Suddenly, little Wiley picks up a pebble and throws it at a window, 
breaking it. A moment before, his big sister Suzy saw what was happening but did not 
prevent it. 
 
Contrast two versions of this case: 
 
Arm’s Length: Wiley was at arm’s length from Suzy, who could easily have stopped him. 
                                               
4 For the classical discussion of fittingness, see D'Arms and Jacobson 2000. 
5 For examples of how causal-explanatory conditions can be incorporated, see e.g. Sartorio 2016; 2007; 
Fischer and Ravizza 1998, ch. 4. For my own previous suggestion, see Björnsson 2017a; Björnsson and 
Persson 2012.  
6 For an excellent overview of some central problems, see Paul and Hall 2013. 
7 Cf. what John Fischer (1994) calls regulative control, and the sine qua non condition in some legal frameworks. 
CONTROL WHETHER also obviously corresponds to the simple counterfactual theory of causation, and is 
subject to the same counterexamples (see e.g. Paul and Hall 2013; Lewis 1973), as we shall soon see. 
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Out of Reach: Wiley was out of reach, and Suzy had no way of stopping him. 
 
Suppose that Suzy had no antecedent reason to think that Wiley would do anything like that, 
and so no reason to keep him within arm’s length. Then it seems that Suzy is a fitting target of 
(perhaps mild) indignation over the outcome in Arm’s Length but not in Out of Reach exactly 
because she whether the outcome would happen in the former case, but not in the latter. (To 
avoid some tedious repetition, I will focus most discussion on the fittingness of indignation, 
returning to the fittingness of guilt in the last section.) 
 However, CONTROL WHETHER is in conflict with what most of us would want to say about 
other cases. Compare: 
 
Backup Billy: Suzy mischievously throws a rock at the neighbor’s window, shattering it. 
Unbeknownst to Suzy, Billy was just about to throw a rock at the same window, but held 
his throw when Suzy’s rock hit. Had Suzy not thrown hers, Billy’s rock would have broken 
the window just as badly a couple of seconds later. 
 
Solo Suzy: Like Backup Billy, but with Billy absent.  
 
It seems that the neighbor can be indignant with Suzy over the sorry state of the window in 
both cases, even though Suzy had no control in Backup Billy over whether it would be in that 
state.8 
 In Backup Billy, it is natural to think that Suzy is responsible for the state of the window 
because it can be traced back to Suzy’s will through a process in which earlier parts brought 
about the later parts: based on her desire to break the window, she formed an intention to throw 
a rock at it, which guided her to do so, which sent the rock flying towards the window, which 
made it hit the window, which broke the window. In light of this, one might think that rather 
than CONTROL WHETHER, what is required for outcome responsibility is: 
 
PROCESS CONTROL: The agent initiated or directed a causal process or series of processes 
leading to the outcome. 
 
To capture our understanding of the example, we can think of processes as something like the 
“normal” unfolding of events according to law-like patterns that can be initiated or directed.9 
 If the outcome relation should be understood in terms of PROCESS CONTROL, this could 
explain why agents who lack CONTROL WHETHER seem to be responsible for outcomes in what 
is intuitively understood as 
 
BACKUP CASES: Cases where the agent had control over whether a certain process would 
lead to the outcome, but where the outcome would have been ensured by some other 
process had the first not done the job. 
 
                                               
8 Backup Billy illustrates the same point as Missile 2 in Fischer and Ravizza 1998. Cf. Lewis’s (1986: 203) backup 
assassin case. 
9 This condition corresponds to accounts trying to understand causation in terms of processes or suitably 
constrained relations of lawful sufficiency, as in Mackie 1974 or (in a very different way) Dowe 1995. 
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In line with its name, Backup Billy was such a case, but examples are easily multiplied, and can 
involve fitting gratitude as well as fitting indignation:  
 
Standby Steve: Lara saw me struggling to find my destination and came to my aide. 
Unbeknownst to Lara, Steve also saw my predicament and would have helped if Lara 
hadn’t. 
 
Because Lara’s intervention led me to find my way, she is responsible for my timely arrival in a 
way that might make gratitude for it fitting even if Steve’s presence ensured that I would have 
found my way without Lara’s help. 
 However, PROCESS CONTROL is clearly not necessary for outcome responsibility. Sometimes 
agents can be responsible for outcomes in virtue of not having prevented a process leading to it, 
as in Arm’s Length. At other times, they can be so in virtue of having removed or prevented an 
obstacle to such a process without themselves getting involved in that process: 
 
Billy’s Board: As Suzy was practicing her throw trying to hit a bullseye painted on a large 
board, Billy yanked away the board just as Suzy threw a rock. Because of this, the rock 
hit and broke the window that had otherwise been protected by the board.  
 
Billy might clearly be responsible for the broken window, but he did nothing to initiate or direct 
the process from which it resulted: intuitively, he merely removed something that would have 
interfered with that process. 
 PROCESS CONTROL is also not sufficient for outcome control. Contrast the following: 
 
Redirection: A runaway freight train is carrying dynamite. Unimpeded, it would continue 
on a track leading into the wilderness. Unfortunately for Rob, he has his handcar parked 
on that track, and it would be wrecked if hit by the train. To save the handcar, Rob can 
switch the train over to a track leading to a small town. He realizes that the dynamite 
might explode when the train crashes into the station, but prioritizes the handcar and 
makes the switch. Several people die when the cargo explodes at the station. 
 
Redundant Redirection: Like Redirection, but unbeknownst to Rob, the track he thought led 
into the wilderness later remerges with the track leading to town. Had Rob not redirected 
the train, the deadly outcome would have been just the same. 
 
In both cases, Rob can be blamed for willingly risking the lives of the townspeople to save his 
handcar. In both cases, Rob also gets involved in a process leading up to the explosion and the 
resulting deaths. But only in Redirection is he responsible for these deaths. Whereas it is fitting to 
be indignant with Rob for willingly risking people’s lives in Redundant Redirection, it isn’t fitting to 
be indignant with him over the outcome.10 
 Redundant Redirection belongs to a family of examples that are naturally understood as 
 
SWITCHING CASES: Cases where the agent’s contribution explains why an already-evolving 
process led to the outcome in the way it did, but where the process would have led to the 
outcome as a matter of course without the agent’s contribution. 
                                               
10 Analogous cases are employed in van Inwagen 1983: 176–77; Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 94–5. 
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As with backup cases, examples are easily multiplied. Consider: 
 
Redundant Ride: Moe the Mobster is on his way to beat up a shopkeeper who has refused 
to pay for “protection” and is about to leave town. Needing a ride there, Moe asks Joe, 
who is standing idly by his taxi car. Joe has overheard what Moe’s plans are, but wanting 
the money more than he cares about contributing to Moe’s plans, he takes the ride. At 
the destination, Moe disappears into the shop where he breaks the shopkeeper’s arm. Had 
Joe not offered the ride, Moe would have asked some other taxi driver who would have 
gladly taken him there; though more scrupulous than Joe, the other drivers were ignorant 
of Moe’s mission. The outcome would have been the same. 
 
The switching structure is clear here too: When Joe got involved, the process leading to the 
outcome—Moe’s acting on the intention to harm the shopkeeper—was already underway and 
would run to completion as a matter of course without Joe’s contribution; Joe only changed the 
exact way by which the process reached its destination. (Assume that there was nothing that Joe 
could reasonably have done to save the shopkeeper; crossing Moe would have meant risking his 
life.) Moreover, even though it is fitting to be indignant with Joe over his own contribution to 
Moe’s enterprise, being indignant with him over the outcome seems misplaced.11 Again, 
PROCESS CONTROL seems insufficient for fitting indignation. 
 
2. Explanatory control 
The cases thus far seem to pull in conflicting directions, suggesting that counterfactual 
dependence sometimes matters (in switching cases and Out of Reach) and sometimes doesn’t (in 
backup cases), and suggesting that process control sometimes matters (in backup cases) but 
sometimes not (in switching cases and Billy’s Board). Importantly, this complexity closely mirrors 
a parallel complexity unearthed by the literature on causation and causal explanation. There, 
varieties of backup cases have provided counterexamples to theories understanding these 
relations in terms of counterfactual dependence, while switching cases have provided 
counterexamples to theories trying to understand them in terms of lawful sufficiency or 
processes.12 The parallel suggests a straightforward explanation for the complexity of the 
outcome relation, namely that it requires that some relevant aspect of the agent was a cause of 
the outcome, or that, 
 
                                               
11 I’m assuming here that it might be morally problematic to get involved in moral wrongs even when one 
cannot reasonably affect whether they are committed or what their consequences will be. This is a 
controversial assumption. For articulation of skepticism for cases where agents cannot significantly affect 
some grand outcome, see especially Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong 2018. I 
defend the assumption in Björnsson 2020b; cf. Nefsky 2016. 
 As noted in the introduction, to deny that Joe is the fitting target of guilt or indignation over the beating 
or the resulting injuries (and so to deny that he is in that sense responsible) is not to deny that Joe is liable to 
bear restorative costs related to the injuries (and in that sense bears responsibility for it) or that he would be 
liable to defensive harm in attempts to avert the injuries (see e.g. Frowe 2019: 643–4).  
12 For a recent overview of many of these complexities, see e.g. Paul and Hall 2013, cf. Björnsson 2007. 
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EXPLANATORY CONTROL: The outcome happened because of a morally relevant aspect 
of the agent.13 
 
Applied to our cases from Section 1, the requirement of EXPLANATORY CONTROL yields the 
right verdicts. In cases where the agent seemed responsible for the outcome, there is also an 
explanatory connection: In Backup Billy, the window is in its sorry state because Suzy wasn’t 
properly concerned with the neighbor, even if Suzy didn’t control whether the window would 
be broken. In Arm’s Length, the window is broken because Suzy didn’t care enough about the 
neighbor to bother stopping her little brother, even if Suzy never interacted with the processes 
leading to the outcome; likewise for Billy in Billy’s Board. And in cases where the agent didn’t 
seem responsible, the explanatory connection is also missing: In Redundant Redirection (unlike in 
Redirection) the deaths didn’t happen because Rob cared insufficiently about the risks, and in 
Redundant Ride, the shopkeeper wasn’t assaulted because of Joe’s lack of concern for his safety, 
even if Rob and Joe got involved in the processes leading to these outcomes. 
 As stated, EXPLANATORY CONTROL leaves open what aspect of the agent should be a cause 
of or explain the outcome in order for moral indignation or guilt to be fitting. But the 
Strawsonian tradition provides what I think is the best answer, and one in line with what I just 
said: for these negative reactive attitudes to be fitting, the outcome must be due to the agent’s 
failure to care as can be morally required of her about what is morally important, or her morally 
substandard quality of will.14 This suggests something like the following: 
 
RESPONSIBLE: X is responsible for Y in a way that makes X a fitting target of indignation 
and guilt over Y if and only if Y is (i) morally bad and (ii) explained (in a normal way) by 
X’s morally substandard will.15 
 
The exact nature of this condition depends on the nature of the because relation. For reasons of 
space, I offer no informative general account of that relation here. Instead I will rely on what I 
take to be pretty stable pre-theoretical intuitions about cases, and the sort of rough 
generalizations that I have offered about backup and switching cases.16 Hopefully, such 
                                               
13 I have formulated the requirement in terms of explanation rather than causation, as the latter is often 
understood in too restrictive a way. In Arm’s Length, for example, it seems clearly right that the window 
shattered because Suzy didn’t bother to stop her little brother but not clearly right that her lack of concern 
caused it to shatter. Similarly, one might think that lack of antibodies explains someone’s covid-19 illness 
without thinking that the lack of antibodies caused the illness. However, a requirement that some aspect of 
the agent be “a cause” of the outcome might be fine: it is more natural to say that Suzy’s indifference was a 
cause of the shattering, and that the lack of antibodies was a cause of the illness. (Cf. Sartorio’s (2007: 761) 
formulation of a transmission of responsibility principle.) 
14 See e.g. Strawson 1962; McKenna 2005; 2012; Arpaly 2006; Arpaly and Schroeder 2014. 
15 I have previously defended a suggestion of this form. See Björnsson 2017b; Björnsson and Persson 2013; 
2012. 
16 Given that none of the best-known systematic theories of causation or causal explanation (e.g. 
counterfactual, INUS/NESS, and process accounts) does a great job accounting for such intuitions (for 
difficulties, see e.g. Paul and Hall 2013), one might worry about trusting these intuitions. However, I argue 
elsewhere (Björnsson 2007) that explanatory intuitions can be made sense of on a natural systematic 
development of the view that causal explanation is a secondary relation, having its unity in the way it can 
serve instrumental reasoning (for an early sketch of such an account, see Menzies and Price 1993). 
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intuitions have done enough to create a presumption for a condition of EXPLANATORY 
CONTROL and will do enough to motivate the modifications to that condition that I will propose 
in Section 5. 
 Before considering more cases, though, I want to address one worry about this strategy, 
prior to worries one might have about claims about particular cases: Without recourse to a 
substantive informative account of the explanation relation, why should we think that a 
condition like EXPLANATORY CONTROL or RESPONSIBLE provides an independent condition on 
responsibility? Why not think that when our explanatory judgments about cases mirror our 
judgments about outcome responsibility, this is because our explanatory judgments track our 
responsibility judgments rather than the other way around?17 And this worry might seem to be 
supported by the fact that people are affected by normative considerations in making their 
causal judgments, standardly favoring factors that violate normative expectations when judging 
whether something caused a certain outcome: the person who broke the rules, or the mechanism 
that didn’t operate as it was supposed to.18 
 I will say three things about this worry. The first is that explanatory judgments and 
attributions of responsibility often come apart. Most obviously, we recognize that when a harm 
happens because of an agent that could not have foreseen the harm, the agent might not be 
responsible for it. More subtly, as illustrated in the next two sections, there are cases of 
overdetermined harms where someone is the fitting target of indignation over the harm even 
though it cannot be said to have happened because of them. The second is that while normative 
expectations do guide what we think of as causes of outcomes, this is true whether the judgments 
concern potentially responsible agents or inanimate mechanisms: the normative expectations at 
work fall short of judgments about responsibility for outcomes. The third is that standard 
explanatory judgments about cases like those discussed in Section 1 mirror judgments about 
cases without potentially responsible agents: indeed, such cases are legion in the causation 
literature. I cannot go through all our cases here and provide structurally equivalent non-
agential cases, but for two simple illustrations, consider counterparts to our basic backup and 
switching cases: 
 
Non-Agential Backup: A gust of wind blows a paper off my desk onto the ground. Had it not 
done that, the gust whipping through the room a couple of seconds later would have done 
the same. 
 
Non-Agential Switch: Like Redundant Redirection, but a falling branch switches the train over 
to the wilderness track.  
 
Just as it seems true about Backup Billy that the neighbor’s window is broken because of Suzy’s 
mischievousness, it seems true in Non-Agential Backup that the sheet of paper is on the ground 
because the first gust of wind. And just as it seems false in Redundant Redirection that the deaths at 
                                               
17 I thank Helen Frowe, Massimo Renzo and an anonymous referee for pressing me on this. 
18 For discussion of the view that causal or explanatory judgments are partly normative, see Sartorio 2007: 
754ff. For evidence that causal-explanatory judgments generally are sensitive to normative assumptions, see 
e.g. Knobe and Hitchcock 2009. 
 BEING IMPLICATED 8 
the station happened because of Rob’s lack of concern with the townspeople, it seems false in 
Non-Agential Switch that they happen because of the falling branch. 
 I think that the cases considered thus far provides strong prima facie support for a 
requirement of EXPLANATORY CONTROL. In the following two sections, however, we will 
consider how it fails to account for the fittingness of indignation over some collective harms and 
some harms due to what I will call fungible switches. 
 
3. Fitting indignation and collective harms 
Collective harms are harms that are explained by the actions or inactions of more than one 
individual but cannot be said to be explained by the contribution of any one of those 
individuals.19 Here is a typical case bringing out the particular problem that concerns us, 
modelled on cases in Held 1970: 
 
Demise: As a man’s house collapses during an earthquake, a falling beam crushes his leg 
and pins him to the floor. Unaware of each other, three passersby hear his desperate but 
fading cries for help, but no one approaches to see what the problem is: the site looks dirty 
and they are eager to escape the unpleasant weather. Had at least two of them heeded the 
man’s calls, they would have been able to move the beam and bring him to hospital before 
his demise. But had only one done so, she would have been unable to move the beam, or 
to get others to help. 
 
Assume that each of the passersby is a fitting target of indignation for not responding to the cries 
for help. Given what she knew, she just lacked sufficiently weighty reasons not to. Further 
assume that if they all had responded adequately, they would have realized the problem, teamed 
up, and saved the man. Then it seems that 
 
INDIGNATION OVER DEMISE: The passersby are fitting targets of indignation over the 
man’s demise. 
 
But it isn’t true about any one of them that  
 
EXPLANATION OF DEMISE: The man expired under the beam because that passerby didn’t 
care enough about the values at stake.20 
                                               
19 Problems of responsibility for collective harms have been widely discussed (see e.g. Held 1970; May 1992; 
Kutz 2000; Isaacs 2011; for a useful overview, see Smiley 2017). But not all is relevant for our current concern 
with the relation between agents and outcomes that can make indignation with those agents over the 
outcomes fitting. Much of the general debate concerns other questions, such as the relations required to owe 
compensation for harms or be liable to defensive harm. Much of the discussion also concerns cases involving 
cooperative groups and features specific to these, but the collective harm problem that concerns me here 
arises equally for harms resulting from the uncoordinated actions or inactions of numerous agents and is not 
essentially liked to cooperation and joint action (Björnsson 2011). Finally, some of the discussions are 
concerned with when one agent is blameworthy or liable based on their complicity in the wrongs committed 
by other agents. By contrast, agents in the cases discussed in this section are more saliently implicated in 
collective harms than complicit in the wrongs of other agents. 
20 The explanatory judgments here mirror those of non-agential cases with the same structure: Suppose that 
a barn door has three latches, that two would have been required to keep it in place when pushed by the 
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This looks like a problem for RESPONSIBLE. Moreover, Demise is representative for a wide variety 
of cases, involving both small groups, as in Demise, and very large groups, as in: 
 
Climate Threat: We would not have been facing an incredibly serious threat of climate 
catastrophe if, during the last 30 years, enough people who were aware of the problem 
had taken steps to promote preventions of it and refrained from supporting and engaging 
in actions particularly prone to promote greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Assume that it is fitting to be (perhaps mildly) indignant with these individuals over their 
individual contributions to the threat and their various failures to promote prevention.21 Under 
that assumption, I think that most of us would also want to say that the group of people who 
were aware of the problem but did nothing are fitting targets of indignation over the fact that 
we are now facing a very severe global threat. But, again, this is in conflict with RESPONSIBLE, 
as it is false of just about every member of that group that we are facing a severe threat because 
of that member’s morally substandard will.  
 One response to the lack of individual control in collective harm cases is to say that the group 
is responsible for the outcome and a proper target of indignation. That claim is in line with 
RESPONSIBLE, as it seems true that the man in Demise expired because the substandard wills of 
three passersby, and true that we are facing a very severe global threat because those aware of 
the climate risks did not take them as seriously as they should have.22 But it fails to capture the 
thought that  
 
IMPLICATED INDIVIDUALS: Contributors to collective harms are implicated in those harms 
in ways that make it fitting to be indignant with them over these outcomes and for them 
to feel guilt.  
 
It is not that the indignation or guilt is directed at the groups as entities existing over and above 
the individual members, but rather that it is directed at the members qua members of such 
groups. In line with this thought, a number of people have suggested that the agents are jointly 
responsible for the outcome, or that they share responsibility, or some such.23 But if indignation 
over an outcome can be fittingly directed at a member of a group in virtue of the group’s 
explanatory control over the outcome and in the absence of the member’s control, then 
RESPONSIBLE is too strict a demand. 
 RESPONSIBLE needs to be weakened, but how? A tempting first proposal would be to merely 
require that the agent culpably contributed to the causal process leading to the harm. But that 
                                               
heifers, but that all latches were open one day and the door swung open when pushed. It seems correct that 
it swung open because the latches were open, but false about any one latch that the door swung open because 
that latch was open. 
21 As noted in n. 11, this is a controversial assumption.  
22 The group arguably lacks any will of its own, but as I argue elsewhere (Björnsson 2020a), RESPONSIBLE 
can be generalized to cover both individuals and groups.  
23  See e.g. May 1992; Kutz 2000; Sartorio 2004; Björnsson 2011. 
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requirement is too weak, as illustrated by At Arm’s Length and Billy’s Board. It is also too strong, 
as illustrated by Redundant Redirection and Redundant Ride.24 
 An alternative suggestion requires that the agent culpably contributed part of a cause of 
the outcome.25 But that doesn’t seem right either. Consider: 
 
Algae Bloom: A massive algae bloom produced large amounts of toxin, enough to kill all the 
fish in a lake several times over. During the bloom, Adam culpably disposed of paint 
solvent in the lake, solvent he knew contained what happened to be the very same toxin. 
Though the small amount of toxin that he contributed was part of what killed the fish, it 
made no difference to the outcome and would have been harmless on its own.26 
 
Though the fish died because of the toxin in the lake, and though Adam culpably contributed 
to that toxin in a way that makes indignation over his recklessness fitting, it does not seem fitting 
to be indignant with Adam over the death of the fish. 
 One might think that what distinguishes Demise and Climate Threat from Algae Bloom is that 
the agent culpable contributes to a cause of the harm that is due to a group of agents. But that also 
does not seem right: 
 
Innocent Polluters: Having been erroneously told by what is normally a very reliable source 
that a boat paint solvent was non-toxic, a large group of people disposed of it in the lake, 
enough to kill the fish in the lake many times over. At the same time, Adam culpably 
disposed of the same paint solvent in the lake, knowing that it contained a toxin. Though 
the small amount of toxin that he contributed was part of what killed the fish, it made no 
difference to the outcome and would have been harmless on its own.27 
 
In this case, like in Algae Bloom, Adam seems to be a fitting target for indignation over his reckless 
handling of the solvent, but not over the death of the fish. This suggest that what is required is 
that all members of a relevant group culpably contributed to the cause of the harm. Buy why 
should the culpability of other agents affect whether one is fittingly indignant with this one agent 
over the outcome? The reason, I will suggest in Section 5, is that when a collective harm 
happened because of group of agents each failed to live up to demands on their will, then each 
agent’s substandard will is relevantly involved in a normal explanation of the outcome. Because 
of the nature of guilt and indignation, this sort of involvement is exactly what they require. 
 First, though, we will consider another kind of problem case. 
 
4. Fitting indignation and fungible switches 
For the next sort of problem for RESPONSIBLE and the EXPLANATORY CONTROL requirement, 
consider a series of three related cases, starting with  
 
                                               
24 Cf. Heinaman’s (1986) suggestion that the agent must be “among the causes of” or “part of a full 
explanation of” the outcome. For criticism, see Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 104–6. 
25 Cf. Sartorio 2004. 
26 Algae Bloom does the same work as Adam’s Lake in Björnsson 2011: 184. 
27 Innocent Polluters does the same work as Partly Excused Helplessness in Björnsson 2020a: 137. 
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Dealer: Doug, a drug dealer, recognizes Alice, an addict, as she is heading to the 
supermarket. He approaches and although she had planned to stay off drugs, she buys 
from him. When Alice later takes the dangerous drug, it triggers a psychosis during which 
she drives off a cliff and dies. 
 
Assume that Doug had neither good reasons nor good excuses for selling Alice the drug, and 
that it is fitting to be indignant with Doug over his act of selling a dangerous drug to Alice. Then 
it also seems fitting to be indignant with him over Alice’s death.28 This is in line with 
RESPONSIBLE, as Alice died because Doug didn’t care about the values at stake as morality 
demands. Contrast this case with: 
 
Dealer v. Pharmacy: Alice has a prescription for her drug and is heading to the pharmacy 
when Doug approaches. Being offered the drug at a lower price, she buys it from him. 
When Alice later takes the drug, it triggers a psychosis during which she drives off a cliff 
and dies. Had Doug not been willing to sell the dangerous drug, the pharmacy would 
have filled her prescription and the outcome would have been the same. 
 
This is an ordinary switching case, like Redundant Redirection and Redundant Ride. A process—
Alice’s intending to get the drug—was under way that would, as a matter of course, lead to 
Alice getting the drug, having the psychosis, and killing herself by driving over a cliff; what Doug 
did was merely to change the way it ran to completion. Even if we assume that it is fitting to be 
indignant with Doug over his act of selling a dangerous drug to Alice, it is unfitting to be 
indignant with him over Alice’s death. This, again, is in line with RESPONSIBLE: it is false that 
Alice died because of Doug’s substandard will.29 
 But now consider our third case: 
 
Dealer v. Dealers: Like Dealer v. Pharmacy, but Alice was on her way to her regular dealers to 
buy the drug when Doug approached, not the Pharmacy. Had Doug not sold her the 
drug, the outcome would have been the same: she would have followed her original plan, 
bought the drug from one of the other dealers, and died driving off a cliff. 
 
Like Dealer v. Pharmacy, this is a switching case, and here too it seems false that  
 
 EXPLANATION OF DEATH: Alice died because of Doug’s substandard will.30  
                                               
28 I’m assuming that one can be indignant with Doug over Alice’s death while thinking that Alice herself was 
also responsible for the outcome, and perhaps to a higher degree. 
29 When it seems false about Dealer v. Pharmacy that Alice died because of Doug’s substandard will, one might 
think that it merely seems so, for pragmatic reasons: because it is explanatorily irrelevant that it was Doug who 
didn’t care, as it was enough that Alice had access to some willing dealer, whoever that would be. But that 
explanation is at least incomplete, as revealed by Backup Billy. There it is similarly irrelevant to the outcome 
whether it was Suzy or Billy who first threw a rock at the window, but it seems unproblematic to say that the 
window is broken because of Suzy’s mischievousness. Likewise, suppose that in Dealer, another dealer, Dirk, 
would have approached Alice and tempted her into buying the drug had not Doug done so. It would still be 
fitting to be indignant with Doug over Alice’s death. (I thank Alex Kaiserman for pressing me on this.) 
30 One might think that by illegally selling drugs, Doug has indirectly contributed to a system supporting both 
addictions and the illegal selling of drugs, and that he is thus indirectly responsible for the outcome. To avoid 
this interpretation, assume that it was Doug’s first deal. 
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But unlike in Dealer v. Pharmacy, and contrary to what one should expect given RESPONSIBLE, it 
seems to me that 
 
INDIGNATION OVER DEATH: Doug is a fitting target of indignation over Alice’s death. 
 
For Alice would not have successfully executed her plan to get the drug as a matter of course if 
everyone had just cared as can be demanded about the values at stake.  
 Here is what I think makes the difference between Dealer v. Pharmacy and Dealer v. Dealers: 
though it is true about both that Alice’s death would have happened without Doug’s disregard 
for the values at stake, only in Dealer v. Dealers did the process require that someone disregarded 
these values in the way Doug did. In virtue of this, Dealer v. Dealers is a case of “fungible 
switching”:  
 
FUNGIBLE SWITCHING CASES: Cases where (i) the agent’s culpable contribution explains 
why an already evolving process led to the outcome in the way it did, (ii) to lead to that 
outcome, the process required someone’s culpable contribution, and (iii) the agent’s 
contribution was fungible, as someone else would have made the required culpable 
contribution had the agent abstained.31 
 
So understood, fungible switching cases are legion: A weapons manufacturer hires an engineer 
to design a part for a land mine that ends up killing and maiming civilians, but numerous other 
engineers were willing and able to supply that knowledge should this engineer refrain. A fascist 
political party hires a copy writer for an advertisement campaign when numerous other copy 
writers would have been willing and capable of doing it instead. A concentration camp hires a 
guard for a job that numerous others would have been willing to do. In each of these cases, a 
harm results from an overall process and the availability of agents willing to culpably contribute 
to that process. And each case provides a counterexample to RESPONSIBLE: the agent enlisted 
in the project is a fitting target of indignation over the harmful outcome, but it is false that the 
harms take place because of their substandard will.  
 Why, though, does it matter that someone’s culpable contribution was needed for the 
process to yield the outcome? The reason, I suggest, is that the substandard will of the agent 
who actually contributes is then involved in what explains the outcome. Even if it isn’t true of 
Dealer v. Dealers that Alice died because of Doug’s disregard for the values at stake, it is true that  
 
EXISTENTIAL EXPLANATION OF DEATH: Alice died because she found someone who 
disregarded the relevant values enough to sell her the drug.  
 
Since that someone was Doug, his substandard will is involved in an explanation of the outcome. 
And the same goes for other cases of fungible switching: they are cases where the outcome takes 
                                               
31 The idea that agents can be responsible for outcomes in fungible switching cases is closely related to the 
suggestion that an agent is responsible for an outcome if they culpably provided something required for that 
outcome, even if it wasn’t required that they provided it (cf. Sartorio 2016: 93–103). However, the latter 
principle gets a case like Innocent Polluters wrong, and would similarly yield what I take to be the wrong result 
for Dealer v. Pharmacy. (By contrast, a related view about liability for defensive harm (rather than fitting 
indignation) seems correct for culpable contributions to wrongful threats. See Frowe 2019: 642–6.) 
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place because the process at work enlists the contribution of someone willing to ignore certain 
values.  
 
5. Reactive attitudes and outcomes 
Cases of collective harms and fungible switches provide counterexamples to RESPONSIBLE. 
However, I have suggested that the troublesome examples could be handled by something like 
the following modification of RESPONSIBLE: 
 
IMPLICATED: X is a fitting target of moral guilt and indignation over Y, and in that sense 
implicated in Y, if and only if Y is morally bad and X’s morally substandard will is involved 
in a normal explanation of Y. 
 
But more needs to be said about what it is for one’s substandard will to be “involved” in a 
“normal” explanation. The key to understanding this, I will suggest, lies in some central features 
of moral indignation and guilt. 
 The kind of moral indignation that concerns us here has both a target and an object: we 
are indignant with someone over something—some action, reaction, omission of theirs, or some 
outcome. (Set aside impersonal indignation.) Likewise, the feeling of moral guilt over something 
targets oneself in relation to the object of guilt. 
 Both sorts of reaction are based on two interrelated evaluations: an evaluation of the object 
of the emotion as morally bad in some way (instrumentally or non-instrumentally), and an 
evaluation of the agent’s will as falling short of what morality demands of her. Each of these 
evaluations can have emotional repercussions on its own: sadness, pain, horror, disappointment, 
contempt, or shame. What makes indignation and guilt special, however, is the relation between 
the attitudes towards the bad object of blame and the attitudes towards the substandard will. 
 To understand that relation, it is important to understand that demands on the will are 
demands that we care about things because these things are important: demands that we be alert 
to what makes it go well with these things and that we adjust our responses accordingly. 
Importantly, because caring has a psychological function—to protect and promote the object 
of care—it has functionally normal ways of operating. Accordingly, there are normal ways in 
which caring as demanded about something can make it go well with it: we notice and act 
skillfully on possibilities to promote or protect what we care about. By extension, there are 
normal ways in which things go badly with that object because of failures to care as required, 
as required by IMPLICATED. 
 Crucially, caring about things as morality requires is a skill the function of which is to 
adequately promote and protect certain values. Like other skills, it is subject to feedback: when 
shortcomings are involved in bad outcomes, this can provide direct corrective lessons for the 
agent or for others learning from her mistakes. Accordingly, both guilt and indignation seem to 
involve the idea that their objects provide direct lessons about the importance of caring as 
required. This aspect might be particularly salient in guilt, which paradigmatically involves not 
only reactions to the object of guilt and to one’s own shortcoming in light of that object, but 
also the sense that the object of guilt highlights the importance of not falling short in that way. 
Likewise for paradigmatic instances of indignation targeted at someone over something, which 
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seek exactly recognition of this lesson in the guilty party. The suggestion now is that for one’s 
substandard caring to be involved in a normal explanation of the outcome in the way of 
IMPLICATED is for it to be involved in such a way that the outcome provides a direct corrective 
lesson.  
 What is it to be so involved? Here I can offer no general account. Instead, I will mention 
three ways in which bad outcomes can be explained by substandard responsiveness to the 
circumstances in a way that grounds direct feedback, and illustrate these by non-moral examples 
involving the substandard responsiveness of only one agent: 
 
1. One instance of substandard responsiveness explains a bad outcome: Kit broke a glass while doing 
dishes because he was insufficiently concerned with its fragility. That the glass broke 
because of his carelessness on the occasion provides a lesson against such carelessness. 
 
2. Several instances of substandard responsiveness jointly explain a bad outcome: Because Kim had on 
numerous occasions imprudently disregarded the need for an economic buffer, she cannot 
afford repairs when her car breaks down. Because the repairs would be very expensive, it 
isn’t true about any one instance of imprudence that her predicament is due to that 
instance, as she would have been short even if she had saved up on that occasion. But the 
outcome nevertheless seems to provide a corrective lesson against such imprudence. 
 
3. The existence of some substandard responsiveness explains a bad outcome: The kids had planned 
to pillage their parents’ candy behind the back of Alex, the babysitter, and did so at a time 
T, when his attention was elsewhere. If Alex had been attentive at T, however, they would 
just have had to wait a few minutes, as his attention was frequently on other things than 
the children. Given this, it is false that the candy was gone when the parents came home 
because Alex was inattentive at T. But it is true that it was gone because there was a 
moment when he was inattentive. Because of this, the role of his inattention at T in the 
disappearance of the candy provides a lesson against such inattention. 
 
Summing up, the suggestion is that paradigm cases of moral guilt and indignation consist in 
typical emotional reactions to (i) a bad object, (ii) one or more substandard wills, and (iii) the 
involvement of the latter in a normal explanation of the former.32 When we think that guilt and 
indignation over the outcome are fitting in some of the cases that we have considered but not 
in others, it is these sorts of reactions that we imagine. It should be clear how the various cases 
that we have looked at exemplify the three types of involvement in explanations of outcomes 
listed above. Arm’s Length, Backup Billy, Billy’s Board, Redirection, and Dealer all exemplify the first 
type, while collective harm cases like Demise and Climate Threat exemplify the second and fungible 
switching cases like Dealer v. Dealers exemplify the third. Independently of type of involvement, 
what they all have in common is that the outcomes provide lessons against the substandard 
caring exemplified by the agent. 
                                               
32 Elsewhere, I discuss other important aspects of these reactions. Particularly important are guilt’s tendency 
towards submission and efforts to mend the situation and indignation’s tendency to demand these things of 
its target. But these tendencies are shaped by the lessons identified by guilt and indignation, and so by the 
relevant kinds of involvement. 
 BEING IMPLICATED 15 
 
 
 
I have argued that guilt and indignation over an outcome can fittingly target an agent even if 
the outcome did not happen because of the agent’s substandard will. For an agent to be suitably 
implicated in the outcome, it is enough that the agent’s substandard will is involved in a normal 
explanation of it. If this is correct, it leaves a number of further questions: If someone joins a 
team engaged in genocide but is never called on to contribute, is that person part of a group 
whose substandard wills explain the outcome? If someone commits an atrocity expressive of a 
lack of concern with human life and I share that lack of concern, can I be the fitting target of 
indignation over the atrocity because of the kind of substandard will that I harbor, even if it isn’t 
due to my token substandard will? Are different degrees of guilt and indignation fitting 
depending on how an agent is implicated in an explanation of harm? 
 Though the general picture of guilt and indignation presented here is suggestive of answers 
to these questions, further discussion will have to wait. Instead, let me end by noting this: Many 
who follow Strawson in understanding responsibility in terms of reactive attitudes have taken 
these attitudes as responding to agents’ qualities of will. But in contrast to this, our practices of 
holding one another responsible are often very explicitly about outcomes. The present account 
helps to makes sense not only of how guilt and indignation can be deeply involved in the 
outcomes that flow from the agent’s will, but also of the range of outcomes that these emotions 
can take. 
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